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Building pressure for peace 
Over the past few months many Western 
European, North American and some sub-
Saharan African states have become 
increasingly critical of Indonesia's human 
rights record on East Timor. But if their 
wish to see Indonesia forge a new policy on 
East Timor is to become reality, they will 
need to craft a more coherent approach, 
combining pressure with continued efforts 
at peacemaking under UN auspices. 
Followin g its ado ption of a Common Position on East Timor in 1996 , the 
European Union (EU) proposed a strongly-
worded resolution on East Timor at the 53rd 
session of the United Nations Commission on 
Human Rights (UNCHR) this spring (see 
pages 2 and 3). Co-sponsored by Canada and 
the Portuguese-speaking African states of 
Angola, Cape Verde and Mozambique, the 
resolution won support from the United 
States which also sent an envoy, John 
Shattuck, to the country in March (see 
page 5). 
Since January the new UN secretary-general, 
Kofi Annan, has breathed life into the stalled 
peace talks by appointingJamsheed Marker, an 
experienced diplomat, as his personal repre-
sentative for East Timor. Marker is attempting 
to revive talks between Indonesian and 
Portuguese foreign ministers and to restart the 
All-inclusive Intra-East Timor Dialogue (see 
page 5). 
Mixed signals 
But despite these important moves, many 
countries continue to turn a blind eye to, or 
even support, Indonesia's policy in East Timor. 
This tendency is most pronounced among those 
Asian states such as China that are trying to 
deflect international criticism from their own 
colonial adventures and human rights abuses. 
But it also prevails among certain African, Asian, 
East European and Latin American 
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governments which have shaken off the burdens 
of colonialism and authoritarianism only to bow 
to Jakarta because of its resources and its role as 
a leader in the South. 
At the same time, western governments have 
been inconsistent in the stances they have taken. 
In May 1995 the development ministers of the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) called for greater 
coherence between government policies on aid, 
trade, international finance and diplomacy. 
Official development assistance is channelled 
through the government of Indonesia and 
supports projects such as the transmigration 
programme criticised by the UNCHR this year. 
Meanwhile, British, French, US and even 
Swedish criticisms oflndonesia's human rights 
violations are difficult to take seriously when 
these countries are the main suppliers of 
weapons used by Indonesian forces to repress 
the resistance in East Timor and civilian 
opposition within Indonesia. 
Options 
It would not be too difficult for OECD members' 
development ministers to ensure that their 
policies on aid to Indonesia are consistent with 
positions taken by their governments at the 
UNCHR and other UN fora. Similarly, trade 
policies, particularly in sensitive areas such as 
arms exports, could be brought into line with 
key western governments' own commitments 
not to sell arms that could be used for internal 
repression or external aggression, while more 
active support could also be given to UN efforts 
to promote talks between Indonesia and 
Portugal, and pressure could be put on 
Indonesia to give more space to the all-inclusive 
dialogue among the Timorese themselves. 
For progress to be made, the network of states 
willing unambiguously to express their concern 
about the situation in East Tim or, and back calls 
for a solution rooted in international law and the 
UN resolutions, also needs to be broadened to 
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include Asian states such as Japan and important 
southern states such as South Africa. Such a 
development could even persuade Indonesia 
to extricate itself from East Timor peacefully 
while increasing its standing in the international 
community as a result. • 
Summary 
The 53rd session of the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights brought 
good news for the East Timorese and those 
campaigning for peace and justice in the 
territory. For the first time since 1993 the 
UNCHR passed a strong resolution that 
was critical of the human rights record of 
the Indonesian government. In this issue 
of Timor Link we present the full wording 
of the motion, analyse its possible impact 
and look at the negotiations which brought 
it about (see pages 2-3 ). Yet this, and other 
positive moves within the international 
community, must be viewed with caution: 
as we argue on this page, there must be 
greater coherence between the aid, trade, 
financial and diplomatic policies adopted 
by western governments towards 
Indonesia. 
Also in this issue, Reverend Pat Smythe 
draws on his first-hand experience to report 
on the stance that the Catholic church within 
Indonesia is taking towards East Timor, and 
we look at the Vatican's position. Peter Carey 
analyses the security situation on the ground, 
based on a recent visit to East Timor. We 
bring news of increased efforts by both the 
United Nations and the United States to 
achieve a breakthrough in the peace process 
and review two new publications which 
provide first-hand accounts of the effects of 
Indonesia's occupation of East Timor and 
the struggle to end it. 
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ANALYSIS 
UNCHR: A clear message 
In contrast to the bland consensus 
statements it has adopted in the past 
three years, the 53rd session of the 
United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights (UNCHRJ this year passed a strong 
resolution criticising the Indonesian 
government's failure to protect human 
rights in East Timor. STEPHEN BARANYI 
reports. 
Before the opening of the 53rd session of the C:'.\l Commission on Human Rights 
(Cl\'CHR 53) in Geneva on 10 March, no one 
could have predicted the outcome of the 
debate on East Timor. But given 
Indonesia's continuing human 
rights violations in East Timor, 
plus high expectations raised by 
the 1996 Nobel peace prize and 
Jakarta's hardline response, the 
stage seemed set for a 
confrontation. 
agents. Nigel Rodley, the special rapporteur on 
torture, reported in detail on 10 cases of alleged 
torture bv Indonesian security forces in East 
timor , noted that he had transmitted 
information about a further 16 cases to the 
government of Indonesia, and expressed regret 
that it had still not invited him to visit East 
Timor. The Working Group on Disappearances 
noted that it is 'particularly concerned at the 
increase in cases of disappearance which 
reportedly occurred in 1996 in East Timor'. The 
special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or 
arbitrary executions and the Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention also reported cases of 
the call for a Memorandum of Understanding 
to allow a programme officer from the Office 
of the UN high commissioner for human 
rights to be assigned to the Jakarta office of 
the UN Development Programme; it was 
thought unlikely that this officer could carry 
out effective human rights monitoring within 
such a framework. 
Benchmark for action 
The text of the draft resolution was put to a 
vote on 16 April, after the government of 
Indonesia had showed it was unwilling to 
negotiate a consensus statement that 
!!! contained the key elements in 
~ the draft resolution. Twenty 
~ members of the Commission 
~ voted in favour, 14 voted against 
~ and 18 abstained. The western 
This was signalled by the 
government of Indonesia's 
response to the outgoing UN 
high commissioner for human 
rights, Jose Ayala Lasso's 
statement on 6 March that a UN 
human rights office would open 
in Jakarta in the near future. 
'It's not for them to get involved 
in handling a matter that falls 
Jose Rarrws H mta, Sperial Representative of the National Counril of Maubere Resistance, 
speaking to the press on East Timor, in Geneva. 
group and the Portuguese-
speaking countries of Africa 
voted in favour, but more 
surprisingly several Latin 
American and eastern European 
countries also supported the 
motion. Unfortunately, several 
states which might have 
supported the resolution, 
including Chile, Japan and 
South Africa, abstained (see 
opposite for a full list of how 
within the jurisdiction of a member state,' said 
Indonesia's minister of state, Moerdiono. 'We 
are implementing human rights very well. It's 
not correct to look at the matter through 
western eyes.' 
Two track approach 
Concern about persistent violations of rights 
and about the government of Indonesia's lack 
of compliance with the consensus statement 
agreed to at UNCHR 52 in 1996 led the 
European Union (EU), under its Dutch 
presidency, to follow a two-track approach at 
the Commission - drafting a strongly-worded 
resolution to be put to a vote, while remaining 
open to negotiations with Indonesia on a 
consensus statement. A majority of EU 
members favoured a statement because it 
would be more binding than a resolution and 
because the EU could lose the vote on a 
resolution; but they agreed that any statement 
should reflect the gravity of the situation. A 
minority of EU members favoured a 
resolution; the East Timorese resistance and 
northern non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) also wanted a strong resolution, 
pointing out that even the weak 1996 
statement had been ignored by Indonesia. 
The European l'nion was persuaded to opt 
for the resolution partly because various UN 
officials tabled reports documenting ongoing 
grave violations of human rights by Indonesian 
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violations in East Timor in 1996. And several 
NGOs produced reports documenting per-
sistent human rights violations.* On 21 March 
Bishop Carlos Belo ofDili sent the Commission 
a letter which unequivocally corroborated these 
reports and some states echoed these concerns 
in their own statements. 
Strong words 
The EU, backed by Angola, Canada, Cape 
Verde, Iceland, Mozambique and Norway, 
sponsored a draft resolution on 9 April. The text 
expressed 'deep concern' about continuing 
violations of human rights in East Timor, about 
lack of progress made by the government of 
Indonesia in complying with the commitments 
it undertook in previous sessions of the 
Commission, and about the policy of 
transmigration. It also unequivocally called on 
the government oflndonesia to release political 
prisoners, ensure that detainees are treated in 
accordance with international standards, 
cooperate with UNCHR rapporteurs and 
working groups, and allow human rights 
organisations access to East Timor (see opposite 
for full wording.) 
Some governments, the East Timorese 
resistance and NGOs expressed reservations 
about elements of the text, particularly the 
welcome it gave to the office of the Indonesian 
National Commission for Human Rights in 
Dili. There were also serious misgivings about 
states voted.) 
The resolution will provide a clear 
benchmark against which to measure the 
behaviour of the Indonesian government over 
the coming year. As full compliance by 
Indonesia is unlikely, members of the 
Commission (particularly those who 
sponsored the resolution) and NGOs will have 
to be vigilant in monitoring that the key 
provisions are being put into action. 
Indonesia's 17 April announcement that it was 
suspending negotiations on the Memor-
andum of Understanding demonstrates how 
difficult this will be (although these talks 
would probably not have led to agreement on 
a mandate for a robust UN human rights 
presence in East Timor). 
Above all, it is to be hoped that the 
government of Indonesia will reflect on this 
strong signal from the highest body of the UN 
rights system and seize the opportunity to 
reconsider its policy on East Timor. • 
*For example, Continuing Human Rights 
Violations in East Timor, by the East Tim or 
Human Rights Centre, (28February1997), 
which can be ordered from the Centre at 
PO Box 1413, Collingwood 3066, Australia. 
Tel 6103-9415-8225, fax 6103-9416-2746, 
e-mail etchrmel@peg.apc.org. 
• Stephen Baranyi is CIIR's human rights policy 
officer for Asia. 
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The UN resolution 
SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN EAST TIMOR 
The Commission on Human Rights 
Reaffirming that all member states have an 
obligation to promote and protect human 
rights and fundamental freedoms as stated in 
the Charter of the United Nations and as 
elaborated in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the International Covenants 
on Human Rights and other applicable 
instruments, 
Mindful that Indonesia is a party to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the 
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of 
Discrimination against Women and to the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 on the protection 
of victims of war, 
Recalling its resolution 1993/ 97 of 11 
March 1993, and bearing in mind previous 
statements by the Chairman of the 
Commission on the situation of human rights 
on East Timor at its forty-eighth, fiftieth, fifty-
first and fifty-second sessions, 
1. Welcomes 
a. The report by the Secretary-General 
(E / CN.4/ 1997/5 1) and his recent 
nomination of a special representative; 
b. The continuing efforts of the Indonesian 
National Commission on Human Rights 
to investigate human rights violations, 
and its decision to establish an office in 
Dili, East Timor; 
c. The commitments by the Government 
of Indonesia to continue the dialogue 
under the auspices of the Secretary-
General for achieving a just, compre-
hensive and internationally acceptable 
solution to the question of East Timor; 
2. Expresses its deep concern 
a. At the continuing reports of violations 
of human rights in East Timor, including 
reports of extrajudicial ki llings, disap-
pearances, torture and arbitrary 
detention as reported in the reports of 
the Special Rapporteur on torture 
(E / CN.4 / 1997/ 7), the Special 
Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, 
or arbitrary executions (E / CN.4/ 
1997 / 60), the Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention (E/ CN.4/ 1997/ 4 
and Add.I), and the Working Group on 
Enforced or Involuntary disappearances 
(E/CN.4/1997 /34); 
b. At the lack of progress made by the 
Indonesian authorities towards 
complying with their commitments 
undertaken in statements agreed by 
consensus at previous sessions of the 
Commission; 
c. That the Government oflndonesia has 
not yet invited thematic rapporteurs and 
working groups of the Commission to 
East Timor, in spite of commitments 
undertaken to do so in 1997; 
d. At the policy of systematic migration of 
persons to East Timor; 
3. Calls upon the Government of Indonesia 
a. To take the necessary measures in order 
to ensure full respect for the human 
rights and fundamental freedoms of the 
people of East Timor; 
b. To ensure the early re lease of East 
Timorese detained or convicted for 
political reasons and to clarify further 
the circumstances surrounding the 
violent incident that took place in 
November 1991; 
c. To ensure that all East Timorese in 
custody are treated humanely and in 
accordance with international standards, 
and that all trials on East Timor are 
conducted in accordance with interna-
tional standards; 
d. To cooperate fully with this Commission 
and its thematic rapporteurs and working 
groups, and to invite these rapporteurs 
and working groups to visit East Timor, 
How they voted at UNCHR 53 
For: Angola, Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, 
Cape Verde, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Mozambique, 
Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States 
of America, Uruguay. 
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Against: Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, Cuba, 
Egypt, India, Indonesia, Madagascar, Malaysia, 
Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, 
Zimbabwe. 
Not participating: Ukraine. 
in particular the Special Rapporteur on 
torture, in line with the commitment 
undertaken to invite a thematic 
rapporteur in 1997; 
e. To undertake all necessary action in 
order to upgrade the memorandum of 
intent of 26 October 1994 on technical 
cooperation into the envisaged 
memorandum of understanding, and 
requests in this regard th e United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights to report on the follow-up to the 
memorandum of intent; 
f. To bring about the envisaged assignment 
of a programme officer of the Office of 
the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights at the Jakarta office 
of the United Nations Development 
Programme, as fo llow-up to the 
commitment undertaken, and to provide 
this officer with unhindered access to 
EastTimor; 
g. To provide access to East Timor for 
human rights organisations; 
4. Decides 
a. To consider the situation in East Timor 
at its fifty-fourth session under the 
agenda item entitled 'Question of the 
violation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in any part of the 
world' on the basis of the reports by 
special rapporteurs and working groups 
and that of the Secretary-General; 
b. To encourage the Secretary-General to 
continue his good offices mission for 
achieving a just, comprehensive and 
internationally acceptable solution to 
the question of East Timor and in this 
framework to encourage the all-inclusive 
intra-East Timorese dialogue to continue 
under the auspices of the United 
Nations. 
Geneva, 16April 1997 
Abstained: Algeria, Argentina, Belarus, Benin, 
Chile, Colombia, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, 
Japan, Mali, Mexico, Nicaragua, Republic of 
Korea, Russian Federation, South Africa, 
Uganda, Zaire. 
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EAST TIMOR: Time for change 
Timor, area 7 ,400 square miles, is one of the 
easternmost islands of the Indonesian 
archipelago and lies 300 miles north of 
Australia, its nearest neighbour. The western 
part of the island, formerly a Dutch colony, 
belongs to Indonesia, whereas East Timor was 
for more than 400 years a Portuguese colony. 
In 197 4 Portugal began decolonising East 
Timor. Newly formed political parties 
discussed options for the future. The 
Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) initially 
favoured federation with Portugal but then 
formed a coalition with Fretilin, the 
nationalist liberation movement, to demand 
independence. A small third party, Apodeti, 
was used as a vehicle for Indonesian 
propaganda in favour of integration. 
On 11 August 1975 the UDT staged a coup 
to pre-empt Indonesian threats to intervene 
if Fretilin came to power. In the ensuing civil 
war 1,500 people lost their lives. By September 
1975, however, Fretilin was in control of 
virtually all of Portuguese Timor, following 
the defection of Timorese colonial troops to 
the liberation movement's side. 
Indonesia, like the United States, was 
worried by the proximity of an independent 
state with radical policies and continued to 
threaten East Timor, despite previous 
asmrances that Jakarta would respect the right 
of the East Timorese to independence. In 
September 1975 Indonesia closed West Timor 
to journalists and on 7 December it launched 
a full-scale invasion of East Timor with the 
knowledge of the United States and the 
encouragement of Australia. After a fraudulent 
'act of self-determination' in May 1976, East 
Timor was declared to be Indonesia's '27th 
Province' in July 1976. The United Nations 
regards the annexation as illegal. 
The invasion and annexation of East Tunor 
has been brutal: up to 200,000 people, a third 
of the population, have died as a result of 
Indonesian rule. But the majority of Tunorese 
have not accepted subjugation: Indonesia has 
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been unable to eliminate the desire of the East 
Tunorese for self-determination and an armed 
resistance movement still remains in the hills. 
Although the invasion has been condemned 
by successive UN resolutions, the international 
community has done little or nothing to 
implement them, given the major economic 
and geopolitical interests of the United States, 
Japan and particularly Australia in the region. 
Indonesia's crucial strategic location and 
regional status - it has the world's fifth largest 
population, and large reserves of oil and other 
natural resources - have all encouraged the 
world to downplay East Timor's agony. 
In recent years, however, several events 
have combined to break East Timor's isolation 
and bring its continued occupation to inter-
national attention. In 1989 the Pope visited 
the territory and in 1991 the planned visit of a 
parliamentary delegation from Portugal, still 
considered the administering authority of East 
Timor by the UN, created huge expectations 
of change. To great disappointment in East 
Timor, the delegation was forced in October 
1991 to call off its visit. 
On 12 November 1991 Indonesian troops 
shot and killed up to 300 East Timorese 
civilians during a funeral procession held at the 
Sant.a Cruz cemetery in Dill, the East Timorese 
capital, for a victim of repression. Witnessed 
by foreign journalists, the Sant.a Cruz massacre 
provided indisputable evidence of Indonesian 
atrocities. 
The Santa Cruz massacre has forced 
governments around the world to criticise 
Indonesia's brutality, injecting new impetus 
into diplomatic efforts to bring about a 
solution to East Timor's suffering. Since 1983 
the UN secretary-general has been entrusted 
with the achievement of a settlement to the 
dispute; and with the post-Cold War era 
providing a new international climate for nego-
tiations, Indonesia faces increased pressure 
to reach a solution with Portugal and the East 
Timorese under the auspices of the UN. 
Whose 
security? 
The recent vote in the UN Commission for 
Human Rights may give the impression of 
movement on East Timor. But the situation 
on the ground remains little altered, with 
the 'security approach' still the order of the 
day. PETER CAREY reports back following a 
recent visit. 
The Indonesian army presence in East Timor is massive. In Ermera, at the heart of East 
Timor's coffee growing area, no less than five 
new battalions (each numbering some 700 
men) moved in during the first week of March. 
Upwards of 3,500 new troops are being rotated 
into the region every eight months. Relations 
between the 45,000 local inhabitants and the 
military are tense: local people avoid going too 
far into their p lantations for fear of being 
accused of having li nks with the guerrillas. 
Indeed, Fretilin commander Konis Santana 
was said to be hiding out in the Ermera area at 
the time. 
Special units 
The presence of th ese territorial battalions 
patrolling in full dress is supplemented by the 
Rajawali (eagle) and Nanggala (magical 
ploughshare weapon) units of the Kopassus 
Special Forces, who wear civilian dress and drive 
unmarked Toyota land cruisers. These shadowy 
forces are thought to be responsible for many of 
the worst human rights abuses in East Timor 
today , with torture and disappearances their 
speciality. Answerable d irectly to their 
commanders in J akarta, they have their own 
modus operandi against which civilians have 
little or no redress. 
Bold lead needed 
These parallel military administrations - special 
forces, territorial battalions, local garrison troops 
and army personnel seconded as civilian admin-
istrators (Babinsa) - make for a complex situation 
on the ground. In this climate, it is difficult to 
envisage any hopes for change in East Timor. 
Indeed, it will take a bold political lead from 
Jakarta to remove the military from th eir 
privileged positions as the Tuan Tanah (lords 
of the land) in East Timor. New layers of security 
force involvement are being added all the time 
- for example, the deployment of the so-called 
garda paksi (defenders of integration youth 
guard, wh o have undergone paramilitary 
training in EastJava under the aegis ofKopassus 
forces). As such, the military' overdose', as it was 
described in the Mubyarto report in 1990, shows 
no signs ofll>ating. 
• Peter Carey is a Fellow and Tutor at Trinity 
College, Oxford. 
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UNITED NATIONS 
Marker of a new 
momentum 
Soon after Kofi Annan was appointed to replace Boutros Boutros Ghali as UN 
secretary-general UN officials began to 
explore ways of breathing life into the stalled 
East Timor peace process. This renewed 
interest in peacemaking came despite the 
postponement of the ministerial talks 
scheduled for 21 December 1996, and was 
triggered by the governments of countries 
such as Norway, which began suggesting that 
mediation by another third party should be 
sought if the UN proved unable to break the 
deadlock between Indonesia, Portugal and 
the Timorese resistance. 
Range of meetings 
The new UN commitment to the search for 
peace was indicated by the appointment, on 
12 February 1997, ofJamsheed KA Marker as 
the secretary-general's personal representa-
tive for East Timor. Marker, who has 
represented the government of Pakistan in 
various capacities, including as ambassador to 
Japan, the Soviet Union, the United States and 
as permanent representative to the United 
Nations, came to Europe after an initial round 
of consultations in the United States. 
He held discussions with senior officials 
in the government of Portugal and with 
representatives of the East Timorese 
resistance in exile. In late March he 
travelled to East Timor and Indonesia, 
where he met with President Suharto and 
Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, as well as with 
the two East Timorese bishops (Belo and 
Nascimiento) and Xanana Gusmao, the 
imprisoned leader of the Timorese 
resistance. 
Marker's visit was marred by an excessive 
use of force which Indonesian authorities 
unleashed against demonstrators who tried 
to meet him in Dili on 23 March. 
Hints of change 
Although some sources have suggested that 
new Ministerial Talks and a new round of the 
All-inclusive Intra-East Timorese Dialogue 
might be convened in the near future, Marker 
has hinted that there might be changes in the 
structure of the peace talks. 
Along with this new high level UN 
interest, real movement in the search for 
peace will also require a new commitment 
by the principal parties to discussing 
substantive issues, including allowing 
legitimate representatives of the East 
Timorese people to participate in the 
dialogue, and making the concessions 
required so that a just and comprehensive 
settlement can be built over time. • 
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UNITED STATES 
United States takes 
more active role 
When John Shattuck, the US assistant secretary of state for democracy, human 
rights and labour, visited East Timor on 20-21 
March it was a signal that his government may 
be willing to take a more active role in the 
search for peace. 
Persistent abuses 
The primary aim of Shattuck 's trip was to 
emphasise the importance the United States 
places on the peace talks held under the auspices 
of the UN secretary-general. At the end of his 
visit, Shattuck stressed that the East Timorese 
'deserve to be able to speak somewhat more 
freely than they can now about their own interest 
in the future', and he noted specifically that 
Washington strongly supported a 'renewed and 
intensified' dialogue that included 'all the 
interested parties in East Timor'. He also raised 
his government's concern about human rights 
violations with Indonesian authorities, including 
the ministers responsible for foreign affairs and 
justice, whom he met in Jakarta. 
The US government's worries about human 
rights were clearly expressed in a report released 
by the state department in January. Although 
this suggested that incidents of 'serious violence' 
had decreased, it documented persistent extra-
judicial executions, disappearances, torture and 
excessive use of force by the Indonesian military. 
Washington's interest in actively supporting UN-
mediated peace talks has increased since the 
award of the 1996 Nobel peace prize to Bishop 
Carlos Belo and Jose Ramos Horta. The Clinton 
administration, partly in response to pressures 
from congress, the media and grassroots activists, 
has cautiously expressed interest in various 
options, including a UN-sponsored referendum 
on East Timor. 
Arms sales 
However, these steps contrast with the adminis-
tration's determination to sell F-16 fighter aircraft 
to Indonesia. Indeed, although congressional 
pressure forced International Military Education 
and Training (IMET) funds to Indonesia to be 
frozen in 1992, small arms sales to be cut off in 
1994, and a partial ban on sales to be expanded 
to include helicopter-mounted weapons in 1995 
and armoured personnel carriers in 1996, the 
White House is now pushing for nine F-16 jets to 
be sold to Indonesia and proposing that IMET 
funding be renewed in the 1997 fiscal year. 
Meanwhile, activists are hoping that the 
scandal caused by Indonesian corporate 
financing of the US Democratic party might 
derail these initiatives, thereby sending a more 
consistent signal to the government oflndonesia 
that it can no longer conduct business as usual 
with Washington. • 
INTERNATIONAL ROUND-UP 
CHURCHES 
Clear stance in Rome 
and East Timor 
News of a new diocese in East Timor was thought by some analysts to reflect 
pressure from Indonesia for Bishop Carlos 
Belo's profile to be curtailed. But recent 
statements by Bishop Belo, Bishop Basilio do 
Nascimiento and the Vatican suggest that 
these misgivings are misplaced, and that the 
Catholic church's willingness and ability to 
promote the rights of the East Timorese may 
be increasing. 
Indeed, the installation of Monsignor do 
Nascimiento as bishop of Baucau on 
19 March was attended by Bishop Maurilio 
Quintal de Gouveia of Evora, Portugal, who 
read a message from Pope John Paul II 
stating unequivocally that 'East Timor is still 
in the midst of difficulty and tension and a 
global solution should be sought [to the 
conflict]'. This confirmed the Pope's 
support for Bishop Belo 's pastoral work 
expressed in their meeting held after the 
Nobel peace prize ceremony in December 
1996. 
Shortly after Bishop do Nascimiento's 
installation in Baucau in March, both 
bishops were interviewed by the Portuguese 
radio station, Renascena. Bishop Belo 
emphasised the gap between the 
expectations raised by his Nobel award and 
the enduring human rights situation in East 
Timor and reiterated his support for peace 
talks under UN auspices while stressing the 
need for complementary dialogue among 
the East Timorese. Bishop do Nascimiento 
expressed his belief that the moment was 
ripe for a breakthrough in the talks between 
the governments of Indonesia and Portugal, 
but emphasised that East Timorese leaders 
would eventually have to be brought more 
directly into the search for peace. 
Like Bishop Belo, Bishop do Nascimiento 
has stressed that his mission is a pastoral 
one, while maintaining that 'No Christian 
and even less a bishop, can shut his voice 
when the human being is being 
disrespected in his or her dignity as the son 
of God' . He has also emphasised that his 
current priority is to build up his diocesan 
structures, as 'we are starting from zero, 
because we lack everything' . 
Bishop Basilio do Nascimiento was born in 
Suai, East Timor. He studied philosophy 
and theology at the Major Seminario in 
Portugal, served as a parish priest in France 
and Portugal, and as a seminary administra-
tor in Evora, Portugal, before returning to 
East Timor in 1994 to undertake pastoral 
duties. 
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CHURCHES 
1Pro,blems for the Indonesian church 
An increasing number of Christian 
churches and agencies around the 
world are providing humanitarian aid to 
East Timor and recognising the political 
aspirations of the indigenous people. 
But, says Reverend PAT SMYTHE, 
support from the Catholic church within 
Indonesia is much more circumspect. 
When he ,·isited East Timor in 1989 Pope John Paul II insiste d that the 
local Catholic church be administered by 
the Vat ican directly through an 'apostoli c 
administrator', currently Bishop Belo. This 
was in deference to the non-recognition of 
Indonesia 's claim to sovereignty over East 
Timor by the U nited Na tions. While 
celebrating mass at Taci-tolu , the Pope , the 
on ly h ead of state other than President 
Suharto ever to visit East Timor, appealed 
for reconciliation and called for East 
Timorese traditions and human rights to be 
respected . He has also acknowledged the 
national identity of the East Timorese 
peopl e when meeting with successive 
Indonesian ambassadors . More recently, the 
presid e nt of the Pontifi cal Council for 
Just ice and Peace , Cardinal Etchegaray , 
travelled to Dili in February 1996 and 
appealed for an earnest dialogue to resolve 
the protracted conflict. 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s the 
Catholic co mmunities in Indon es ia gave 
generous hum a nitarian aid to th e East 
Timorese . The neighbouring West 
Timorese diocese of Atambua was only one 
of a number which provided material and 
personal resources to assist the local church 
to minister to the needs of the people; and 
clergv , religious , an d lay workers from 
Indonesia still se n ·e in East Timor. Yet 
support for the political aspirations of the 
East Timorese h as been less in evidence. 
Although Indones ian Catholic bishops 
occasionally add their voices to government 
diplomats ' calls for the diocese of Dili to be 
affi liated to their conference, on the whole, 
people from the Indonesian church in East 
Timor accept their government's account of 
the politi ca l situation and confine th eir 
activity to 'purely pastoral ' matters. 
Propaganda 
One of the reasons for such tepid support is 
that government agencies tend to suppress 
or distort the truth and the church , despite 
having the advantage of ecclesiastical 
channels of communication, receives 
inadequate information on East Timor -
even in neighbouring West Timor. 
Propaganda, which consistently presents the 
East Timorese resistance as a communist-
inspired, destabilising, separatist rebellion 
of a fanatical and intransigent minority, is 
evident across the archipelago, and church 
people of all denominational persuasions 
are influenced by it. Thus the efforts of the 
East Timorese to preserve their national 
identity and express their fundamental right 
to political self-determination have not 
been properly appreciated by many 
Indonesians, even within the family of the 
church, Catholic or Protestant. 
Also important is the fact that the 
Christian community in Indonesia is very 
much a minority (9 per cent) in an 
overwhelmingly Muslim population (87 per 
ce nt) , so th e church needs to behave 
Studmt.s at St Michael's Minor Seminary in Kupang, West Timor. 
6 
prude ntly if it is to keep its relative 
fre edoms . There is no doubt that all the 
churches feel vulnerable and it is 
questionable whether a confrontation with 
the present regime would have any positive 
effect - challenging th e government on a 
basically political issue could result in 
further restrictions. 
Mixed views 
However, there has always been a significant 
body of opinion, at least within the Catholic 
church, calling for a critical stance. There 
are those who feel that the church has the 
right and duty to be outspoken about what 
it perceives to be offences against justice 
and human freedom - be this in respect of 
East Timor , or throughout Indonesia. 
Others disagree . An ' open letter ' from 
Cardinal Darmaatmadja to the government, 
calling for an investigation of the violence 
in Jakarta on 27 July 1996, had a mixed 
reception in Catholic communities. In the 
eastern islands people were dissatisfied with 
its restrained style, whereas in Java it was 
approved of for precisely the same reason. 
Nonetheless, in February 1997 Cardinal 
Darmaatmadja criticised the ' security 
approach' used by authorities in East 
Timor, noting that it had 'failed to reduce 
tensions [or] address underlying problems' . 
He called for an 'open dialogue' including 
the range of East Timorese opinion. In 
their Lenten Pastoral the Indonesian 
bishops called for 'profound introspection 
as to why, after 20 years of integration, some 
Timorese have yet to live it' . Declaring that 
'the key to a settlement lies in the creation 
of a social milieu in which the people of 
East Timor feel their cultural, religious and 
historical identity is recognised and 
safeguarded', they too stressed the 
importance of listening to ' the real 
aspirations of the East Timorese'. 
In East Timor, where fundamental 
human rights are continually violated or 
frustrated by the agents of the Indonesian 
government, the Church is the only 
institution with the political strength to 
voice the aspirations of the indigenous 
people. For them the support of fellow 
believers from far afield is more in evidence 
than that from near neighbours. For the 
sake of all the people of East Timor - and 
of Indonesia - it is important that the gap 
between these views is reduced. And this 
requires more communication and mutual 
appreciation between the sister churches. • 
• Reverend Pat Smythe, from St Boniface 
Church, in Bentham, UK, visited East 
Timor in 1996. 
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Dialogue or 
aside? 
The All-inclusive Intra-East Timorese 
Dialogue (AIETDJ was set up to bring 
the views of East Timorese to bear 
on the UN-brokered ministerial talks. 
MILENA PIRES traces the progress of 
the dialogue and asks how inclusive it 
really is. 
Adecision to bring together a full spectrum of East Timorese opinion was 
taken at the fifth round of the so-called 
Tripartite Talks between the foreign 
ministers of Portugal and Indonesia, in 
January 1995. The final communique from 
those talks put forward terms of reference 
for the dialogue. They were to pursue a 'free 
and informal exchange of views to explore 
ideas of a practical nature that might have a 
positive impact on the situation in East 
Timor and assist in the establishment of an 
atmosphere conducive to the achievement of 
a solution'. 
The communique made it clear, however, 
that the AIETD would 'not address the 
political status of East Timor' and would 'in 
no way constitute a parallel negotiating track 
or be a substitute for the ministerial talks 
under the auspices of the [UN] secretary-
general'. 
The proposal drew a mixed response. 
Some quarters were suspicious of the 
initiative, coming as it did on the heels of the 
discredited London 'reconciliation meetings' 
sponsored by the government of Indonesia. 
There were doubts over the format that the 
dialogue was to take and the exclusion of the 
political issue. The publication of a 
provisional list of participants also provoked 
questions about their status and legitimacy 
and who or what they n:presented. Although 
participants were to be there ostensibly in an 
'individual capacity', a division was apparent 
between supporters of integration with 
Indonesia (largely those allowed to leave East 
Timor for the meeting) and anti-
integrationists (as represented by the leaders 
of the East Timorese resistance abroad). 
Gender perspective 
The third AIETD (for which a date has not 
yet been set) may be decisive in resolving 
these issues and determining whether the 
dialogue is to be a legitimate forum for East 
Timorese input into the Tripartite Talks. 
A key issue, however, remains to be 
addressed. Just one female participant, Ines 
de Almeida, is to be found among 29 males 
in the AIETD. The United Nations has 
argued that the Timorese leaders failed to 
raise the issue of equal or acceptable gender 
participation and that the UN's own mission 
failed to identify any outstanding women 
personalities, particularly inside East Timor. 
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Yet the gender disparity places a question 
mark over the representativeness and 
legitimacy of a UN-organised process that 
has such little regard for the participation of 
women. 
Although Ines de Almeida has tried to 
raise issues from a gender perspective -
resulting in a reference to the situation of 
women in the second Burg Schlaining 
Declaration (March 1996) - the presence of 
only one female participant in the dialogue 
does not bode well for the advancement of 
women. 
The gender imbalance is particularly 
striking given the UN resolutions on the 
equal participation of women, the work of 
the Commission for the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women, the Beijing 
Declaration and Platform of Action and the 
1993 UN Human Rights Conference 
Declaration, which states that the human 
rights of women should be gradually 
'integrated into the mainstream ' of UN 
activities. Indonesia, which is signatory only 
to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
and the Convention on All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women , must also 
bear responsibility for the gender imbalance 
in the AIETD. The Indonesian government 
has resisted any change to the composition 
of the dialogue. 
The exclusion of the political question, 
and the composition and format of the 
dialogue have determined its impact on the 
Tripartite Talks. Room for the AIETD 
participants to have input to the Tripartite 
Talks has also been circumscribed by the 
positions of the Portuguese and the 
Indonesian governments. Indonesia has 
remained intransigent in the face of the 
positions agreed in the consensus statements 
of the UN Human Rights Commission of 
1994, 1995 and 1996. Inflexible over the 
political status of the territory, it has also 
lacked the political will to implement even 
the most basic steps to ease the human 
rights situation inside East Timor. Although 
all Indonesian military attaches to the 
embassies of the European Union member 
states are now required to have served a tour 
of duty in East Timor, and all diplomats 
dealing with the question of East Timor are 
required to undergo special training which 
includes a visit to the territory, these are 
superficial changes. On the ground, the 
Indonesian position has hardened (see page 
4). Curiously, Indonesia accuses the 
Portuguese government of the same trait. Its 
strategy at the 53rd session of the UNCHR 
has been to accuse Portugal of refusing to 
negotiate a consensus statement, although 
Jakarta has done nothing to implement any 
of the previous statements. 
The sense of elation among participants at 
the first round of the AIETD in June 1995 was 
clouded by the cumbersome process of estab-
lishing a workable methodology. The first Burg 
Schlaining Declaration was subsequently 
overturned when the Indonesian government 
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forced participants from inside East Timor to 
refute General Assembly Resolution 37 / 30. 
This resolution asks the UN secretary-general 
to initiate consultations with all directly 
concerned parties to come to a settlement, asks 
the General Assembly to continue to monitor 
the situation in East Timor and recognises 
Portugal as the administering power. 
Round two in the dialogue, in March 1996, 
was characterised by attempts to derail the 
process by Indonesia 's ambassador and 
special adviser to President Suharto on East 
Timor affairs, Francisco Lopes da Cruz. The 
fact that Mari Alkatiri of the East Timorese 
Resistance signed a watered-down 
communique with reservations, demonstrates 
the fragility of the process and is a reminder 
that many Titnorese living in the territory 
have effectively been silenced. Another 
example is Guilhermo Gon\;:alves who, in the 
first AIETD denounced the so-called Balibo 
Declaration and the illegal annexation of 
East Timor , and was prevented from 
participating in the second round. 
Energy injection 
Portuguese policy on East Timor has 
progressed from being largely passive and 
reactive during the time of Foreign Minister 
Pinheiro to a strengthening and consistency 
under Foreign Minister Durao Barroso, to the 
beginning of a more creative and proactive 
approach, as shown by the proposals made by 
Prime Minister Guterres at the Bangkok Asia-
E urope ministerial meeting (ASEM) . 
Portugal's current position, and the 
nomination ofjamsheed Marker as the UN 
secretary-general's personal representative for 
East Timor, will inject greater energy into the 
process. However, the current impasse in the 
Tripartite Talks still needs to be broken. The 
establishment of a cultural centre and the 
development of human resources - two areas 
identified by the AIETD - have not been taken 
forward for implementation and discussion at 
the UN-brokered ministerial talks. 
Although the Tripartite Talks have moved 
from confidence building to discussion of 
substantial issues and have included the 
establishment of the AIETD, their 
effectiveness has yet to be proven. At this 
early stage the importance of the AIETD as a 
serious forum for East Timorese 
contribution to and 'active participation' in 
deciding the territory's own future are 
hardly being helped by the limitations 
imposed on them by the United Nations. 
The representativeness and legitimacy of the 
dialogue - particular over gender - are 
challenges that will demand great political 
will on all sides to resolve. • 
• Milena Pires is vice president of the 
Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) and 
is responsible for the UDT's women's 
department. She is currently studying for 
a Masters degree in international politics 
at the Universite Libre, Brussels. 
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NEW PUBLICATIONS 
Insights from the outside 
Children of the Resistance: The current 
situation in East Timor as seen through 
the eyes of two Australian tourists 
Rebecca \\'in re rs and Brian Ke llY 
The cover photograph and subtitle of this booklet gi\'e the impression that it is a 
travelogue bY two Australian tourists who 
were charmed b\' East Timor's beaut\'. Yet 
. . 
Children of the Resistance by Rebecca Winters 
and Brian Kell\', reveals a depth of research 
and analysis that one rarely finds in tourists ' 
narrati\'es. Bv avoiding spies of the 
Indonesian Armed Forces posing as 
'guides ', by straying far from the worn path, 
and by interviewing members of the Armed 
Forces for the Liberation of East Timor 
(Falintil) as well as ordinary Timorese, the 
authors gained ins ights into the country's 
drama that would be hidden from most 
tourists. 
Their first insight is that all is not well. 
The\' see that many people bear physical 
and psychological scars from the invasion 
and the most brutal years of the 
occupation, while there is ongoing 
repression by the Indonesian authorities 
that ensures nobody forgets the reality of 
foreign rule. The authors also see that 'the 
Resistance' is not just the few hundred 
Falintil guerrillas, the military front of the 
National Council of Maubere Resistance 
(CNRM): it includes a clandestine network 
of civilians who provide logistical support 
to the guerrillas and actively oppose the 
occupation, plus a much larger segment of 
the population which also opposes the 
Indonesian presence. 
The authors conclude that the CNRM's 
claim that 'almost all Timorese [ ... ] are 
part of the Resistance ' is true. Detractors 
argue that there is no evidence to support 
this view, but a UN-supervised referendum 
on the future of East Timor, as proposed by 
the resistance, would provide a clear 
answer. 
Winters' and Kelly's third insight is that 
the Timorese believe that international 
solidarit,· can make a difference. As one 
guerrilla commander put it: 
• 
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Let ,·our government know you care. If 
there is international pressure, if the UN 
resolutions are implemented [ ... ] East 
Timar would be freed [ ... ] Falintil and the 
clandestine front within East Timar will 
continue to fight; but without help from 
outside we can neYer hope to defeat 
Indonesia " ·i th its huge army. 
Children of the Resistance, by Rebecca Winters 
and Brian Kelk, can be ordered for 
LSS6.00 (discount on bulk orders) from 
A.ustralians for a Free East Timor (AFFET), 
PO Box 215:). Darn-in '.\T 0801 , Australia. 
Tel +618-8948-4022, fax +618-8983-2I 13. 
An insider's testimony 
East Timor's Unfinished Struggle: Inside 
the Timorese Resistance 
Constancio Pinto and Matthew Jardine 
Constancio Pinto was a child during the Indonesian invasion, and became a 
leader of the clandestine front from the 
mid 1980s to the early 1990s. He now lives 
in the United States. His first-hand account, 
East Timor 's Unfinished Struggle, adds much 
to the growing literature on East Timar. 
It begins with a nuanced depiction of life 
under Portuguese colonialism, provides a 
fascinating analysis of relations between different 
Timorese political factions before the invasion, 
and movingly describes Pinto's own experience 
oflife under Indonesian rule. 
His account of the invasion and the first 
years of occupation conveys the pain and 
horror which the majority of Timorese 
experienced as they were attacked, displaced, 
encircled, starved, captured, forcibly relocated 
in concentration camps and brought back to 
their places of origin, only to find that these 
had been transformed in to Indonesian 
settlements. It reflects the fear experienced 
when Indonesian forces entered and searched 
houses; the isolation felt following the closing 
off of East Timor from the outside world until 
1989; and the mistrust fostered by the huge 
network of spies and administrators employed 
by the Indonesian state. 
However, Pinto also conveys the sense of 
hope generated when the Timorese began 
rebuilding their society through 
underground networks, transforming the 
Catholic church from an ally of the ancien 
regime to a genuine expression of popular 
aspirations. They reorganised military 
resistance following its devastation between 
1978 and 1982; built up daring clandestine 
resistance networks in the 1980s; and 
launched the first acts of defiance which 
eventually led to the 'Timorese intifada' in 
the 1990s . Woven into this political 
narrative are the stories of real people like 
Pinto himself and touching portraits of men 
like Xanana Gusmao, who has become the 
Nelson Mandela of the Timorese cause. 
The stories also document the suffering of 
activists tortured or killed by security forces, 
of Bishop Belo surviving three assassination 
attempts, and of ordinary people whose dignity 
is daily trampled on by the cultural arrogance 
of the occupiers. And they express the disap-
pointment which the Timorese feel at the inter-
national community's largely ineffective 
response to Indonesian policy. 
What is most striking, however, is the faith 
that Pinto and his compatriots still place in 
the international community. 
We continue to put our hope in the UN to 
solve the East Timor problem; we don't 
see any solution for East Timor through 
military means [ ... ]Just as the UN has 
helped to address some other problems in 
the world, such as the conflict in Namibia, 
it can help sol\'e East Timor's problems 
through diplomatic means, but only if the 
member states of the UN, especially the 
powerful countries that control the 
Security Council [ ... ] support East Timor's 
right to self-determination [ ... ] But it is 
doubtful that this will happen unless there 
is strong pressure on the government by 
people in those countries. 
Alongside Pinto's testimony US journalist, Allan 
Nairn's foreword relates the horror he 
experienced first-hand during the massacre in 
Santa Cruz cemetery in November 1991, and 
describes how policy generated by the pressure 
of grassroots campaigns in the United States has 
been eroded by a coalition of Indonesian 
government agencies, US transnational corpo-
rations and US government agencies brokered 
by the US-Indonesia Society. US activist, Matthew 
Jardine, in his introduction and epilogue, 
documents the continuity and changes in US 
policy on Indonesia since the 1960s. Like Pinto 
and Nairn,Jardine does not lose faith in the 
possibility of change in Washington or in East 
Timor. Citing the examples of campaigning on 
South Africa and Central America, he concludes 
that citizen pressure can have an impact. 
Therein lies the challenge for voluntary 
organisations. 
• East Timor's Unfinished Struggle: Inside the 
Timorese Resistance, by Contancio Pinto 
and Matthew Jardine, can be ordered for 
US $16.00 from the East Timor Action 
Network. Tel +914-428-7299, 
fax +914-428-7383, 
e-mail: etan-us@igc.apc.org. 
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